



Hymas | Investment Management Inc.

# Floating Rate Preferreds Theory & Practice

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Toronto

This seminar is being filmed for later distribution

# Preferred Shares

- Fixed rate & Schedule of income
- Holders CAN'T put company into bankruptcy
- Little or no chance for Capital Gain from issue price
- Asymmetric risk / reward profile
- No dilution of claims (quality may suffer)
- Income is received as dividends
- Have First-Loss Protection

# Floating Rate Preferreds

- Long-Term Income is dependent upon Canada Prime
  - Fixed Reset issues are not strictly considered Floating Rate (controversial!)
- All are perpetuals with attendant credit risk
  - One SplitShare is sometimes an exception: PPL.PR.A
- May be redeemed at issuer's option
- Most are non-financial, cumulative
- None have been issued for quite some time
- Class is dominated by BCE issues

# Three Classes of “Floating Rate”

- RatchetRate
- FixedFloater
- Floater

# Ratchet Rate

- Pay a varying percentage of Prime
  - Income is  $\text{Prime} \times \text{Percentage} \times \text{Par}$
- Percentage can vary between 50% & 100%
- Changes according to Trading Price:
  - \$25.50+: Decrease by 4%
  - ...
  - \$24.50+: Increase by 4%
- Exchangeable to Fixed-Floaters every 5 Years
- Redeemable any time at 25.50


# Fixed Floaters

- Exchange Date every five years
- On Exchange Date:
  - Dividend Rate changed to percentage of five-year Canadas
    - Standard minimum is 80%; 100-110% is usual
  - Redeemable at par
  - Exchangeable to Ratchet Rate

# Floaters

- Pay fixed percentage of Canadian Prime
- All are currently redeemable at par, but trading well below call price

### Constituents of HIMIPref Indices






# Issuance Expectations

- Not much demand for Floating Rate when Prime is Low
- Banks cannot issue Ratchets as part of Tier 1 Capital
- But ... long term interest rate swaps are easy to arrange
  - Issuers can, potentially, issue floaters and swap payments to fixed rate and vice versa


# Return Expectations

Note! There is a very small number of issuers in this sector; most of which have experienced deteriorating credit. Index Returns must be interpreted with caution, as they reflect a great deal more company-specific risk than is desirable for an index.

**Monthly Return Frequencies  
December 1993 to March 2009  
(183 Months)**



### Cumulative Total Return




# Five Months Lost >6%

- Total Return, 4Q08
  - Ratchet, -46.0% (BCE)
  - FixFloat, -39.4% (BCE)
  - Floater, -42.1% (BAM)
- In addition to credit quality concerns, there was the possibility of an extended period of low prime


# Floating Rate Preferreds Are Not Money Market Instruments!

- Dividends are (or will be) based on short-term rates
- Credit Risk is Perpetual
- Recent defaults of Quebecor World & Nortel

# Ratchets Hit a Limit




# Dividends on Floaters Fall







# ... As Yields Rise



# “Double – Whammy”



# Floater Now Yield Far More Than Prime



# Credit Quality

A Quick Overview

# Balance Sheet Factors

- Debt to Equity Ratio
  - Is debt “with recourse” or “non-recourse”?
  - Term Structure of Debt
    - Short-Term?
    - “Lumpy”?
- Quality of Assets
  - Goodwill & intangibles?
  - Resale value in bad times (liquidation value)?
- Working Capital
- Current Ratio
- Acid Test

# Off-Balance-Sheet Factors

- Unfunded pensions?
  - BCE \$2.1-billion vs. \$14.5-billion common equity
- Guarantees & Derivatives
  - e.g. Credit Default Swaps & options
  - More usually, companies can guarantee debt of unconsolidated subsidiaries
  - May have exposure unrelated to current value
    - PWF: \$97-million exposure vs. fair value +\$3-million

# Income Statement Factors

- Stability of earnings?
- Coverage of required payments?

# Cash Flow Effects

- Non-Cash contribution from subsidiaries?
- Cash Flow from operations?
- Required future investments?



# Credit Ratings

- Credit Rating Agencies have become the scapegoat for the current crisis
- Track record is pretty good
- Agencies have access to material non-public information
  - Regulation FD
  - National Policy 51-201

# Don't Give Up Credit for Free!

- Sounds obvious?
- January, 2007: Bell Preferred (Pfd-2) shareholders vote to exchange to BCE Preferreds (Pfd-2(low)), for a pittance
- Usually better to be close to the money, unless holding company is diversified

# **Analysis of Floaters**

# Analytical Problem

- While Floaters pay on the basis of short-term rates, their credit risk is perpetual
- There are not many long-term bonds that are suitable for benchmarking
- Liquidity is also an issue: Ratchets are very slow traders; Floaters only a little better
- There is very little data available for analysis
- Direct Arbitrage will rarely be practical, but comparisons can give clues to rich/cheap


# Interest Rate Swaps

- OTC Derivatives with standardized terms
- Counterparties agree to exchange cash-flows
  - “A” pays floating, receives fixed
  - “B” pays fixed, receives floating
- June, 2008: \$458-trillion notional outstanding world-wide
- USD rates available from Federal Reserve

# Compare Fixed Rate with Floating Rate

- BAM.PR.M / BAM.PR.B (Yield Difference)
- PWF.PR.F / PWF.PR.A (Yield Difference)
- USD 30-Year Interest Rate Swap
  - Fixed Rate Payer receives 3-Month LIBOR
  - Not directly comparable (basis risk):
    - USD
    - LIBOR is not Prime
    - 30 Years is not Perpetual
    - Embedded calls in Preferreds
    - Taxation & liquidity effects
    - Preferreds are junior to trading losses

### Swap Spread & Perp/Floater Spread




US 30-Year Swap Spread

BAM.PR.M / BAM.PR.B Spread

PWF.PR.F / PWF.PR.A Spread


# Arbitrage Calculation Makes Floaters Look Expensive





# Box Arbitrage

- In bond markets, a “box trade” involves:
  - Extend term in one market
  - Shorten term in a related market
  - Duration neutral
  - Credit neutral
- An attempt to take advantage of changing slopes in the yield curve
- A PerpetualDiscount / Floater box trade analysis should provide clues regarding relative valuation



# Conclusion


- Arbitrage analysis can be used as a guideline to indicate relative valuation
- Currently, Floaters look somewhat rich to Perpetuals (but maybe cheap to bank accounts!)
- Relative valuations have been volatile
- Once we have an indication of whether particular floaters are rich or cheap, we can use these to benchmark the others
- Trading & Speculation opportunities

# **Analysis of Fixed-Floaters**

# Assume Conversion to Ratchet

- Issuer has
  - Some discretion regarding fixed-rate
  - No discretion over ratchet rate
- Won't do you any favours!
- All current issues specify minimum of 80% of 5-Year GOC Rate
  - Average is 105-115% of 5-Year GOC
  - Compares unfavourably with FixedResets

Canada 5-Year Bond & Canada Prime



# Assuming Conversion to Ratchets...

- Then price of Fixed-Floater part should be sum of:
  - Price of Ratchet
  - Adjustment for dividends for current period
- In current environment this is easier:
  - Prices are far away from ratcheting trigger
  - May assume dividend is 100% of Prime
- This leads to concept of “Preferred Pairs”

# Preferred Pairs



# What Makes a Pair?

- Strong Pairs
  - Interconvertible on defined dates
  - Ratchets / FixedFloaters
  - (Someday) FixedResets / Floaters
  - Price MUST (sort-of) be equal on Conversion Date
- Weak Pairs
  - Ratchets & Floaters from same issuer
  - Price SHOULD be equal (at some point)

# Strong Pairs: Current Yield?

$$R_F * (25 / P_F) = R_R * (25 / P_R)$$

$$\rightarrow R_R = R_F * (P_R / P_F)$$

Where:

- $R_F$  is the rate payable on the FixedFloater
- $P_F$  is the price of the FixedFloater
- $R_R$  is the rate payable on the Ratchet ( = Prime)
- $P_R$  is the price of the Ratchet

This is wrong ... but this is what the market is doing!

# Why is Current Yield Wrong?

- Fixed Rate will change at conversion time
- Two elements of Strong Pair become inter-convertible
  - Therefore, difference in price should reflect difference in yields only until conversion date

# Correction for Interconversion

$$R_F * (25 / P_F) = R_R * (25 / P_R) + \underline{(P_F - P_R) / (P_R * T)}$$

Correction Factor amortizes the difference until conversion date

$$\rightarrow R_R = (P_R * R_F) / P_F + \underline{(P_R - P_F) / (25 * T)}$$

$R_R$  is now the break-even Prime-Rate until Conversion


# Data

<b>FF/Ratchet</b>	<b>NextExch</b>	<b>RF</b>	<b>PF</b>	<b>PR</b>	<b>Term</b>
BCE.PR.T/S	11/1/2011	4.502%	15.03	13.15	2.5
BCE.PR.Z/Y	12/1/2012	4.331%	14.84	12.97	3.6
BCE.PR.A/B	9/1/2012	4.800%	16.09	13	3.4
BCE.PR.C/D	3/1/2013	4.600%	15.57	12.83	3.9
BCE.PR.F/E	2/1/2010	4.400%	15.08	13.25	0.8
BCE.PR.G/H	5/1/2011	4.350%	14.55	12.81	2.0
BBD.PR.D/B	8/1/2012	5.267%	14.26	8.8	3.3
BAM.PR.G/E	11/1/2011	4.350%	12.3	10.65	2.5


	Wrong R <sub>R</sub>	Right R <sub>R</sub>
FF/Ratchet		
BCE.PR.T/S	3.94%	0.97%
BCE.PR.Z/Y	3.79%	1.72%
BCE.PR.A/B	3.88%	0.20%
BCE.PR.C/D	3.79%	0.95%
BCE.PR.F/E	3.87%	-5.48%
BCE.PR.G/H	3.83%	0.39%
BBD.PR.D/B	3.25%	-3.41%
BAM.PR.G/E	3.77%	1.16%
<b>Average</b>	<b>3.76%</b>	<b>-0.44%</b>
<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>0.21%</b>	<b>2.58%</b>

If Prime is Less than R<sub>R</sub> through the period,  
FixedFloaters are better

BBD.PR.D/B Conversion FF - R Price



**BCE.PR.ZY Conversion: FF - R Price**






# Weak Pairs

- Prices merely SHOULD be the same
  - e.g. Ratchet Rate issues from same issuer
- Ratchet Market is currently very efficient
  - Comprised almost entirely of BCE issues

## Trading Spreads by Issuer



# Market Efficiency

# Why is the Market Inefficient?

- Small issue size
- Irrational fear of default
- Not enough “hot money”
- Not enough dealer capital
- Not enough people watching
- Arbitrary Investment Manager policies
- Tax Effects

# Sell Liquidity – Don't Buy It

- Place Limit Orders, not Market Orders
- Let the market come to you
- Any investor can pick up extra money
  - Spreadsheet, discount brokerage for traders
  - Buy-and-Holders simply buy the cheapest
    - Rebalancing periodically will help – provided you're not paying full retail commission.



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